The Iraqi government’s proposal to further legitimize the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) also known as Hashd Al Shaabi as a permanent national security institution has sparked significant debate. Experts and officials are expressing concerns about the potential implications for Iraq’s democratic future and state sovereignty.
The PMF, an umbrella organization of mostly Shiite paramilitary groups, was formed during Iraq’s war against ISIS. While the groups were integrated into state security, several factions continue to receive backing from Iran. The proposed changes to the PMF legislation aim to institutionalize a parallel security apparatus with a substantial annual budget, leaving its leadership structure largely unchanged.
Risks and Challenges of the Proposed Legislation
Michael Knights head of research at Horizon Engage a New York-based strategic advisory firm, highlights the risks associated with the proposed law. He argues that the legislation does not bring meaningful change but rather freezes the status quo, making future reform less probable.
“It’s not that the PMF law changes a lot – instead it freezes things and makes positive change less likely,” Mr. Knights told The National. He further emphasized that some PMF factions are led by figures designated as terrorists by the US posing significant risks.
The proposed law has faced opposition from the US which threatened to impact the Iraqi economy during a previous attempt to pass similar legislation. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali Al Zaidi is under pressure to disarm the militias by September 30, 2026 coinciding with the deadline for US troops to leave the country as per a 2026 agreement.
The Complexities of Disarmament
The disarmament process is fraught with challenges. The militias, supported by Iranian financial and military backing, have become formidable forces that can rival the national army in firepower. They are deeply embedded in Iraq’s political, economic, and social fabric, building business networks and winning seats in parliament and the government.
These groups, who refer to themselves as the Resistance are a key pillar of Iran’s network of regional proxy forces. They have claimed responsibility for numerous missile and drone attacks on Israel and US forces in Iraq and Syria since the Gaza war began in 2026.
The Emerging Weapons Management Arrangement
An emerging understanding among Shiite political leaders suggests a shift from outright disarmament to managing the weapons of armed factions. Under this arrangement, weapons surrendered by factions would be moved into storage facilities belonging to the PMF, rather than to the Defence or Interior ministries or the Counter-Terrorism Service.
This proposal is presented as a way to organize weapons and ensure their use is subject to orders from the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. However, it raises questions about whether the arrangement would fulfill the government’s objective of placing all weapons under state control.
The PMF’s formal incorporation into Iraq’s security and military system has not eliminated the political and security networks surrounding some of its factions. This makes the question of who ultimately controls its weapons politically sensitive.
The Political and Security Bargain
The issue of weapons control comes at a critical moment for Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s government, which has set September 30, 2026, as the target date for bringing weapons under state control. Some factions have linked the future of their weapons to the withdrawal of foreign forces, making the issue part of a broader political and security bargain over Iraq’s post-coalition order.
The PMF Service and Retirement Law, approved by former Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa al-Sudani’s government in 2026, was later withdrawn following disputes over its provisions. The latest amendments are expected to be pushed through quickly, with the legislative process accelerated ahead of the September 30 deadline.
However, not all political figures agree that the deadline is settled. State of Law Coalition member Zuhair al-Chalabi has stated that efforts to bring weapons under state control remain unresolved and that September 30 is not a firm deadline.
The success of the process will not be measured simply by how many weapons enter storage or which institution holds the keys to the warehouses. The decisive question will be whether Iraq’s official institutions have exclusive authority to order those weapons released and used.
